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I. Introduction 
With the fast development of the internet and methods of electronic transactions, capital 
markets have simultaneously become increasingly global over the past few decades. To take 
advantage of this process, institutional investors are looking to diversify their portfolios across 
global markets, and corporations are seeking international capital to lower their cost of capital. 
The increased need for two parties to exchange information calls for high-quality financial 
reporting in a format that is comparable and consistent across international boundaries. Higher 
quality requires corporations to disclose enough information to facilitate investors’ decision-
making process. Comparability, which is defined as the quality of the information used to 
identify similarities between two sets of economic phenomena (FASB, 2008; IASB, 2008), 
requires reports to be generated in a format that potential investors are familiar with to reduce the 
high cost of acquiring and processing information.  
One important strategy has been designed to switch the domestic standards of financial 
reporting to a set of more uniform global standards. One such accounting regulatory changes, 
perhaps the most important one in recent years, is the adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the European Union (EU). In 2002, the EU required all firms in 
its list of member countries to switch from their domestic accounting standards to IFRS financial 
reporting for the fiscal years ending after Dec 31, 2005.  “Compared to local financial reporting 
standards in many countries, IFRS is more investor-oriented, and it requires substantially more 
disclosure regarding certain items, such as discontinued operations, segment reporting, cash-flow 
statements, asset impairment, and share-based payments.” (Hung, Li and Wang, 2014).  
Adoption of IFRS in the EU has already had a significant impact on their equity markets. 
First, adoption of IFRS significantly improved the quality of financial reporting because it 
mandates that corporations disclose more detailed information. Researchers report increased 
analyst forecast accuracy (Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013) and reduced 
post-earnings announcement drift (Hung et al., 2014) following the adoption. I refer to this 
impact as the “information effect” of IFRS adoption. Second, the adoption of IFRS has changed 
the comparability of the accounting standards among adopting countries, as well as between 
adopting and non-adopting countries. Prior studies suggest that one major reason that investors 
are reluctant to invest in foreign countries is the high costs associated with the collection and 
processing of information (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Bradshaw et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2005; 
Covrig et al., 2007), and after the adoption of IFRS, foreign mutual fund ownership increased 
(DeFond et al., 2011; Yu and Wahid, 2014). I refer to this impact as the “comparability effect”. 
The information effect brings new information to investors, which would otherwise not be 
disclosed before the adoption, while the comparability effect helps investors gain a better 
understanding of the reported information and make better investment decisions. Adoption of 
IFRS has also had other economic impacts, such as improving market liquidity and lowering the 
cost of capital (Daske et al., 2008). This paper focuses on the impact of IFRS adoption on 
investors.  
Thus far, our understanding of the impact of IFRS adoption on investors has been restricted 
to the asset allocation decisions of mutual funds (DeFond et al., 2011; Yu and Wahid, 2014). 
One important question remains unclear, namely, whether and how the adoption of IFRS affects 
the ability of investors to generate abnormal returns. It is a more important threshold question for 
investors in mutual funds because they care more about fund performance, rather than how the 
fund managers allocate their assets. Studying this issue also helps to explain and describe the 
motivation of increased foreign investment. Do foreign investors invest more because they earn 
higher abnormal returns, or because they can better diversify risks when they are more familiar 
with the financial disclosure? It will help the market regulators with their future decision-
making, which is one of the primary questions this paper seeks to address. 
My study also fits in with the literature that studies mutual fund performance with respect to 
regulatory shock. When searching for factors that explain mutual fund performance, researchers 
are often subject to severe endogeneity problems. The factors that are particularly compelling are 
usually correlated with management, which is not directly observable. To address this issue, one 
efficient approach is to resort to external shocks that selectively affect one group of mutual funds 
more than others. Gaining a better understanding of the nature of external shocks would shed 
light on the underlying mechanisms that drive fund performance. For example, after the 
documentation reveals a positive correlation between fund performance and the size of the fund 
family (Chen et al., 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008), the competition between big fund families 
and small fund families becomes a popular empirical model for such research. Using Reg FD as 
an external shock, Bhojraj et al. (2012) report that stock-picking skills of large fund families 
were weakened after the selective disclosure of material information by issuers is prohibited. 
Their findings suggest that big fund families may have privileged access to data from firms due 
to their larger holdings in the firms, and the private information explains their superior 
performance. Another identified factor underlying the superior performance of big fund families 
is that they usually have more resources to support large research departments and state-of-the-
art technologies to facilitate their information acquisition process (Nocera, 2004). When the 
information processing cost is reduced after the adoption of the machine-readable XBRL formats 
in firms’ 10-K filings, small institutions’ stock-picking skills improved more compared to those 
of large institutions (Bhattacharya et al., 2014).  
Compared to the two aforementioned shocks, adoption of IFRS contains several features that 
make it a unique source of important information. First, instead of affecting big and small fund 
families, adoption of IFRS affects two other different groups of investors: domestic and foreign 
funds. It has been documented that funds have information advantages with respect to investing 
in stocks of firms that are geographically close (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Portes and Rey, 
2005; Gehrig, 1993; Brennan and Cao, 1997). The asymmetry of this information could be the 
consequence of many different factors, such as familiarity with securities (Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 
2005), the similarity in culture and language (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001), and/or conformity 
in accounting standards (Bradshaw et al., 2004). Thus, the adoption of IFRS may hurt the 
information advantages of domestic investors in two ways. First, the IFRS adoption lowers the 
cost of information collection by mandating more disclosure from the firms. Some information 
that was privately enjoyed by domestic funds became available to foreign funds after the 
adoption. Second, adoption of IFRS increases the comparability in the accounting standards 
between domestic and foreign investors.  
The increase in comparability reduces the cost for foreign investors to switch between two 
different sets of accounting standards. To compare the impact of IFRS adoption on domestic and 
foreign funds will make it possible to better understand how financial disclosures help investors 
with their investment decisions. Second, IFRS adoption affects investors through a mechanism 
differently than those associated with Reg FD and XBRL. Both the adoption of Reg FD and 
XBRL regulate mutual funds directly by governing the channels through which they obtain 
information. Depending on the importance of the channels, mutual funds are exposed to the 
shocks in different ways. For example, Reg FD may only affect big fund families because small 
fund families rarely have access to selective disclosures by firms. For comparison, the adoption 
of IFRS regulates the firms that issue securities instead of mutual funds. All mutual funds are 
exposed to the same enhancement in the quality of financial disclosures, though the ability of big 
and small fund families to process the information may still differ. Changes in the performance 
of domestic and foreign investors can be attributed to the nature of the investors themselves 
rather than different exposures to shock. In addition, IFRS adoption affects global mutual funds 
instead of just mutual funds in the U.S., as in the case of Reg FD and XBRL. My conclusions 
will be more general and less subject to potential features specific to U.S. funds. 
This paper compares the stock-picking skills and performance of domestic and foreign 
mutual funds on European equity markets before and after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. 
Following Baker et al. (2010), a fund’s stock-picking skills are measured using the earnings 
announcement returns of the stocks that the fund trades. I found that the skills of foreign funds 
generally improved after the adoption, while the skills of domestic funds tended to deteriorate. 
Consistent with this change in stock-picking skills, larger improvements in the performance of 
the foreign funds were observed compared to their domestic counterparties, when measured as 
the benchmark-adjusted returns following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997 
(DGTW returns). This paper further demonstrates that this IFRS effect on domestic and foreign 
investors is primarily driven by their trading activities in stocks with larger information 
asymmetry and in stocks issued by the firms with more complex business models. The findings 
indicated that the adoption of IFRS reduced the information gap between domestic and foreign 
investors, and this reduction helps foreign investors with their competition against domestic 
investors.  
In addition, the paper attempts to segregate the information effect and the comparability 
effect. Results indicated that after controlling for the changes in comparability, the improvement 
in the information environment maintains significant explanatory power for the observed 
differences in the performance between domestic and foreign investors.  
Some of the results are hard to interpret at this moment. For example, my results show that 
domestic funds underperform after the adoption of IFRS. Since the adoption of IFRS improves 
firms’ overall information environment, all mutual funds should get equal or more information 
after the adoption. It is thus against intuition why domestic funds do worse when they have equal 
or better information. One potential explanation is that domestic and foreign mutual funds are 
playing a “zero-sum” game in the EU equity market. A larger improvement in the information 
acquisition for foreign funds will put them in a better position when competing with domestic 
funds, and hence, they reap more profit from the domestic funds. However, using the industry 
concentration as a proxy for competition, I did not get supporting evidence for this hypothesis. 
Further study is required to explore this puzzle. 
This study offers a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, it is intended to 
serve as a valuable contribution to the literature on IFRS. The focus of the current literature is 
generally restricted to the asset allocation of foreign investors, and this paper is the first to 
examine investor performance. When compared to asset allocation, fund performance is a more 
important feature for mutual fund investors. Seeking performance is also one of the driving 
forces that often explain the asset allocation decisions of the fund managers.  
Second, while it is reasonable for the current literature to focus on foreign investors, it is 
important not to ignore the fact that domestic funds are also one of the major players in the 
market, and their competition is vital for the survival of foreign funds. This paper compares 
domestic investors with foreign funds side-by-side and tends to demonstrate that IFRS adoption 
also has effects on domestic investors.  
Third, when most of the IFRS studies focus either on the information effect or the 
comparability effect, this paper has been structured to segregate the two effects to determine 
whether the improved disclosure quality is more helpful for foreign investors.  
Fourth, this paper is designed to expand the positive accounting theory by showing that, 
despite the fact that aggregated information in financial disclosures is helpful for investors when 
making investment decisions, increasing the information content of the disclosure may not 
improve every party’s welfare. In fact, financial disclosures play a role to level the playing field 
between different groups of investors.  
In the literature, the paper by DeFund et al. (2011) is probably the one most similar to this 
research. Their research suggested that the adoption of IFRS attracts more foreign investment, 
and similar results were found in my study. However, the results of this investigative paper 
expand this literature with two new interesting findings: (1) foreign mutual funds could better 
select stocks than domestic funds after the IFRS adoption. This may be one of the reasons why 
foreign funds invest more assets in those countries that have adopted IFRS; and (2) while 
DeFund et al. (2011) indicated that foreign funds invest more in IFRS countries, the results of 
this investigation indicate that their asset allocation within the same country is also affected by 
IFRS adoption, which is to say that foreign funds tend to invest more in stocks with larger 
information asymmetry. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses 
hypotheses, Section 3 explains data selection and variable construction, Section 4 presents 
analyses and results, and Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the results and important 
conclusions that can be drawn from the research. 
 
II. Hypothesis development:  
Information helps investors’ investment decisions. Regulatory shocks that reduce the information 
gap between funds from big families and small families also tells to reduce the competitive 
advantages enjoyed by big fund families (Bhojraj et al., 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2018). The 
same argument also applies to domestic and foreign funds after IFRS adoption. Before the 
adoption, domestic funds enjoy information advantages when trading local stocks. After the 
adoption, mandatory disclosure of more detailed information will often lower the cost of 
information collection. Some of the information that was exclusively enjoyed by domestic funds 
will become publicly available to all investors after the adoption. If this argument is true, foreign 
funds should benefit more from the adoption of IFRS than domestic funds. Thus I have my first 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of IFRS affects the portfolio choices for investors. I expect to 
observe larger improvements in the stock-picking skills of foreign mutual funds when trading in 
countries that adopted IFRS compared to their domestic counterparts. Accompanied by the 
improved stock-picking skills, foreign mutual funds should invest a larger portion of their assets 
in the countries that have adopted IFRS. 
The adoption of IFRS has two different effects. First, it improves the information content 
of the financial reports by mandating more detailed disclosure from the firm (“information 
effect”). Second, switching to new accounting standards changes the comparability in the 
accounting standards between the investor and investee (“comparability effect”). The 
information effect brings new information to investors which would otherwise not be disclosed 
before the adoption, while the comparability effect helps investors better understand the 
information in the financial reports of investee firms.  
If the observed effect of IFRS on domestic and foreign investment is explained by the 
information effect, then a more profound effect in stocks that are experiencing larger 
improvements in their information environment (i.e., stocks of firms with low transparency) 
should be expected. To meet the requirements of IFRS, the management teams of these firms 
must improve their financial reporting structure and reveal more information in the interest of 
transparency. The first proxy used in this study for information transparency is the volatility of 
stock return. Another type of such stocks should be those issued by firms with more complex 
business models, such as firms with multiple segments, or those in more competitive industries. 
Thus, the second proxy used in this study is the volatility of the firm earnings. These generally 
lead to the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of IFRS in hypothesis 1 should be more profound in stocks with larger 
information asymmetry.  
In addition to the improvements in the quality of financial reporting, adoption of IFRS 
also changes the comparability of accounting standards between investors and investees. 
Improvements in the comparability help foreign investors so they can compare the reporting of 
similar firms in their own countries, allowing them to make better investment decisions. It is 
unclear whether it is the new information in the disclosure that helps the foreign investors or the 
better understanding of the accounting numbers that helps the foreign investors. Disentangling 
these two effects is challenging because there is no convincing method for quantifying the 
improvements in the information content for different European countries. This paper addresses 
this challenge by controlling for the change in comparability and examines the correlation 
between fund portfolio choices and improvements in the information environment of the stocks 
they are trading. If it is the enhanced information environment that helps foreign investors, one 
should expect to see a positive correlation between the improvements in fund performance and 
improvements of the information environment of the stocks that the fund trades. The 
improvement in the information content is proxied by stock return volatility and earnings 
volatility. Hence, this logically leads to the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: If enhanced information content helps foreign investors, foreign investors should 
show better stock-picking skills when trading stocks with larger improvements in the quality of 
their financial reports.  
 
III. Sample and Key Variables 
A. Sample Construction 
I obtain the list of countries that mandatorily adopt IFRS for fiscal years ending after 
December 1, 2005, from Tan et al. (2011). Their list consists of countries in the European Union 
and three other countries (Australia, Philippines, and South Africa). The treatment group in the 
sample includes mutual funds domiciled in the European Union. The control group comprises 
mutual funds domiciled in non-European Union countries, but not those from Australia, 
Philippines, and South Africa. 
Next, I obtain mutual fund holdings data between the years 2002 and 2009 from Thomson 
Reuters Ownership database. Only funds with identifiable country codes are kept in the sample. 
Mutual funds domiciled in the four non-EU countries that also adopt IFRS in 2005 (Australia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and South Africa) and two tax heavens (the Bahamas and Bermuda) are 
excluded from my sample. I select active equity funds whose investment styles are aggressive 
growth, core growth, core value, deep value, GARP, growth, income value, international, 
momentum, specialty, yield, mixed style, and sector-specific. Only the equity part of the 
holdings is used for analysis, which accounts for about 94% of the reported assets under 
management. Following the literature, European firms that adopt IFRS voluntarily before 2005 
are also excluded from my analysis. To get a balanced sample (Atanasov and Black, 2016), a 
fund must report its holdings in the European market for at least once during 2002-2005 (3 years 
before adoption) and during 2007-2009 (3 years after adoption) to be included in the sample. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the sample used in the study in the year 2004 and 
2008. In panel A, I report the characteristics of the mutual funds from EU countries that adopt 
IFRS. These characteristics include the number of funds from each country, the average dollar 
value of their assets under management (Fund Size), and the percentage of their AUM invested 
in the European market. In panel B, I report the same characteristics as in panel A for mutual 
funds from non-adopting countries. Table 2 presents the attrition table for my data selection 
process.  
I obtain the quarterly earnings announcement dates from Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly 
for US and Canadian firms, and from the Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope database for firms from 
other countries. Voluntary adopters (firms that were already using IFRS before the mandatory 
adoption) are excluded from my sample. I obtain the stock exchange information and daily stock 
prices from CRSP for US firms, and Compustat Global for non-U.S. firms. The stock exchange 
information is used to find the corresponding local index for each security. I listed the 
information for each local index in Table 3. I obtain firm characteristics, such as earnings (EBIT) 
from Worldscope for non-US firms and Compustat for US firms. Firms’ market cap is calculated 
using the stock price and shares outstanding data obtained from Compustat Global and CRSP. 
 
 
B. Key Variables 
Stock-picking skills: Following Baker et al. (2010), I measure a fund’s stock-picking skills 
using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks that the fund trades. The calculation 
procedure is explained in Figure 1. Briefly, in each holdings disclosure, I identify the securities 
that are a fund’s “first-buy” and “last-sell”. A security is defined as “first-buy” in one holdings 
disclosure if it is the first time for this security to show up in a fund’s portfolio in the past 3 years 
(at least). A security is defined as “last-sell” if the security is still included in the fund’s portfolio 
in the previous holdings disclosure but never shows up in the portfolio afterward for at least three 
years. For each “first-buy” and “last-sell” stock, I calculate its 3-day return centered around the 
closest earnings announcement of that security following the fund’s holdings disclosure. I then 
calculate the stock-picking skills reflected in each holdings disclosure by subtracting the equal-
weighted earnings announcement return for all “last-sell” stocks from the equal-weighted 
earnings announcement return for all “first-buy” stocks. Those security-disclosure pairs for 
which I could not find earnings announcement date, or those with the closest earnings 
announcement date longer than 90 days after holdings disclosure are dropped from the sample 
(Baker et al., 2010). If either first-buy or last sell is missing for a holdings disclosure, then the 
stock-picking skill is calculated with the missing value set to zero. If both first-buy and last-sell 
are missing, then the stock-picking skill for that holdings disclosure is assigned a missing value.  
DGTW return: Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), portfolio 
performance is measured using a benchmark-adjusted return (DGTW return). For each month, 
125 passive portfolios are formed based on the market capitalization and book-to-market ratio in 
the previous year, as well as the momentum in the previous 12 months for each European 
country. DGTW return for the stock is calculated by subtracting benchmark return from the raw 
return. The portfolio return is calculated as the value-weighted DGTW returns of all stocks in the 
same portfolio. 
HHI: Following Feldman, Saxena, and Xu (2018), mutual fund industry concentration 
(competition) in country i in year t is proxied by a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, calculated as: 
HHI(i,t) =  
Where MS2(j,t) is square of the market share of fund j at time t, measured as the fund’s 
investment in country i over the total investment in the country i by global mutual funds. 
Stock return volatility rank: I calculate the monthly returns for European stocks using the daily 
price from Compustat global dataset. I then define low (high) return volatility stocks if their 
return volatilities are ranked in the bottom 30% (top 70%) in the country where they are 
domiciled. Stocks with prices lower than $1 are excluded before ranking. I choose 30% as a 
cutoff because mutual funds tend to invest more in stocks with low return volatility. Using 30% 
as a cutoff will generate the most balanced sample.  
Earnings volatility rank: I obtain earnings data (EBIT) for European firms from Thomson 
Reuters Worldscope database. Earnings volatility is calculated as the standard error of Earnings 
before Interest & Taxes between year t-5 and t-1, deflated by its mean. I then define low (high) 
earnings volatility stocks if their earnings vitalities rank in the bottom 30% (top 30%) of all 
stocks in the same country. As in the case of return volatility, firms with a stock price lower than 
$1 are excluded from the ranking process. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Main Results 
The adoption of IFRS in the EU enhanced the quality of financial disclosures. The first 
question to be asked is whether this improvement in disclosure quality will affect investors’ 
portfolio choices and whether this effect differs for domestic and foreign investors. I start my 
analysis by comparing two groups of mutual funds: European funds (domestic funds) and non-
European funds (foreign funds). Portfolio choice has two meanings: the ability to generate 
abnormal returns and asset allocation decisions.  
 
A. IFRS Adoption and Mutual Funds’ Return-Generating Ability 
First, the ability of a mutual fund to generate abnormal returns is examined, and this analysis 
is performed at both the stock level and fund level.  
At the stock level, the performance of individual stocks that mutual fund trades is examined 
following Baker et al. (2010), and the results are presented in Figure 2, and Tables 4 and 5.  
Figure 2 presents the parallel trend of the stock-picking skills of foreign and domestic mutual 
funds when they invest in the European equity market. Stock-picking skills of the two groups are 
almost indistinguishable before the IFRS adoption in 2005. During the three years after the IFRS 
adoption (2007-2009), the foreign funds (NonEU) significantly outperformed the domestic funds 
(EU).  
Table 4 is a summary of univariate analysis. In Panel A, the stock-picking ability of EU and 
non-EU funds are compared when investing in the European equity market. Statistically 
significant (t-stat=4.17) improvements in the stock-picking skills of non-EU funds were 
observed after IFRS adoption. This improvement is also economically large: a zero-investment 
long-short portfolio of which long positions in first-buy stocks and short positions in last-sell 
stocks generates an additional 3-day earnings announcement return of 0.333% after the IFRS 
adoption. In contrast, the stock-picking skills of domestic funds deteriorate. This deterioration is 
statistically significant (t-stat=2.36) but economically small (a 3-day return of -0.1%). Panel B is 
a control test where the stock-picking skills of the same two groups of funds are compared when 
they invest in stock markets outside Europe. No significant difference was observed during the 
same time period. This result tends to rule out the possibility that the observed increase in stock-
picking skills for non-EU funds is due to any change in the personal traits of fund managers.   
To test the robustness of the findings in Table 4, the following multivariate analysis was also 
performed: 
Stock Picking Skillsi,t = α + β1 NonEUi + ∑ βt1 YearDummyt + ∑ βt2 NonEUi * YearDummyt + 
∑ βX Xi,t + ε (1) 
Stock Picking Skills measure the skill (of fund i in quarter t) as the 3-day earnings 
announcement return of the stocks that a mutual fund trades (First Buy – Last Sell), following 
Baker et al. (2010). NonEU is an indicator variable that equals 0 if a fund is domiciled in Europe, 
and it is equal to 1 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals 0 during the 3 years before 
IFRS adoption (2003-2005) and equals 1 during the 3 years after IFRS adoption (2007-2009). 
This study also creates an indicator variable for each year in the sample (2003-2009) and 
interacts them with NonEU. Year dummy for 2003 is not included in the regression to avoid 
multicollinearity. Xi are control variables, which include PortSize, FundSize, and EU Experience. 
PortSize is calculated as log (1+ total assets invested in European equity market) for non-
European funds, and log (1 + total assets invested in domestic equity market) for European 
funds. FundSize is calculated as log(1 + total assets under management). EU Experience is 
calculated as log(1 + months since the first time a fund invested in EU). 
Table 5 presents the results of regression Model (1). The interaction term NonEUi * Year are 
the variables of interest. In column (1), the coefficient for the interaction term is positive (0.30) 
and significant at 1% (t-stat=4.42), which means that compared to the domestic mutual funds, 
non-European funds could gain an additional 3-day return of 0.30% in the European equity 
market after the adoption of IFRS. In models (2), (3), and (4), one indicator variable is created 
for each year to show the parallel trends in the stock-picking skills of domestic and foreign 
funds. During the three years before IFRS adoption, foreign funds (NonEU) underperform 
domestic funds (EU) for one year (2003) and are indifferent for two years (2004 and 2005). After 
the IFRS adoption, foreign funds significantly outperformed domestic funds for two years (2007 
and 2008, see the positive coefficients on NonEU*2007 and NonEU*2008).  
My results in Table 4 and 5 suggest that the adoption of IFRS adoption is more beneficial for 
foreign funds. Non-European funds can select better stocks, while European funds appear to be 
doing worse after the IFRS adoption. 
The approach employed to calculate stock-picking skills only explains part of the fund 
performance (Baker et al., 2010). So fund-level analysis was performed by examining the 
characteristics-adjusted return (DGTW) of the portfolio of individual funds, following Daniel et 
al. (1997). Table 6 compares the DGTW return of EU and Non-EU funds during the 3 years 
before and after the IFRS adoption. First, the DGTW return of each stock was determined by 
calculating the benchmark-adjusted return based on its previous year’s market cap, book-to-
market ratio, and momentum. The DGTW return of a portfolio was calculated as the value-
weighted DGTW return of all the stocks in the portfolio. As can be seen, a larger improvement in 
the DGTW return is observed in the non-European funds after IFRS adoption. After the adoption 
of IFRS, foreign funds earned an average extra return of 2.133% over a 6-month period (t-
stat=3.28), or an average extra return of 3.844% over a 12-month period (t-stat=3.97) when they 
were compared to domestic funds. Since most of the mutual funds in the target sample report 
holdings twice per year, return over a 6-month period has been presented. A 12-month result is 
also presented, which follows Daniel et al. (1997). The fund-level results are consistent with the 
findings of this study at the stock level in Tables 4 and 5. 
My results on the performance of domestic mutual funds after the IFRS adoption in Tables 4 
and 6 appear to be somewhat puzzling. For instance, a negative return was observed for domestic 
funds during the post-adoption period (-0.082% in the stock-picking skills in Table 4 Panel A, 
and -0.582% and -1.259% in Table 5). Since the adoption of IFRS improves the firm’s overall 
information environment, all mutual funds should get equal or more information after the 
adoption. It is thus against intuition why domestic funds do worse when they have equal or better 
information. One potential explanation is that the domestic and foreign mutual funds are playing 
a “zero-sum” game in the EU equity market. A larger improvement in the information 
acquisition for foreign funds will put them in a better position when competing with domestic 
funds, and hence, they reap more profit from the domestic funds. So, the superior performance of 
the foreign funds is at the cost of underperformance of domestic funds. If this explanation is 
accurate, the following two hypotheses emerge: (1) according to Feldman, Saxena, and Xu 
(2018), fund managers have a larger incentive to search for alpha in a more concentrated (less 
competitive) mutual fund industry, hence we should observe a more significant effect of IFRS 
adoption in countries with high mutual fund concentration; and (2) in a more competitive 
country, the benefit enjoyed by foreign funds is more likely to be at the cost of domestic funds. 
So we should see the more negative performance in the domestic funds after the adoption in 
countries with highly competitive mutual fund industries. These two hypotheses are tested and 
compared in Table 7.  
Following Feldman, Saxena, and Xu (2018), I calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) using the market share of all actively managed mutual funds in each European country 
and use it as a proxy for the mutual fund industry concentration (competition). A higher HHI 
indicates more concentrated and less competitive industry. Hence, the following multivariate 
regressions were preformed: 
Stock Picking Skillsi,t = α + β1 NonEUi + β2 Postt + β3 HHIi,t + β4 NonEUi*Postt + β5 
NonEUi*HHIi,t + β6 Postt*HHIi,t + β7 NonEUi*Postt*HHIi,t + ∑ βX Xi,t + ε   (2a) 
DGTWi,t = α + β1 NonEUi + β2 Postt + β3 HHIi,t + β4 NonEUi*Postt + β5 NonEUi*HHIi,t + β6 
Postt*HHIi,t + β7 NonEUi*Postt*HHIi,t + ∑ βX Xi,t + ε     (2b) 
If my hypothesis 1 is true, namely that the effect of IFRS adoption should be more significant 
in more concentrated (high HHI) countries, a positive and significant coefficient on the triple-
interaction term (β7) should be expected. Consistent with this hypothesis, the coefficient for the 
triple-interaction term is 4.03 with a significance level of 1% when the dependent variable is the 
stock-picking skills. However, the coefficient is insignificant when the dependent variable is the 
DGTW. 
If hypothesis 2 is true, that the performance of domestic funds should be increasingly 
negative in countries with competitive mutual fund industries (low HHI), and a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term Post*HHI (β6) should be observed. However, the results of 
this study indicated a negative coefficient of -2.40 when the dependent variable is stock-picking 
skills. In addition, the coefficient is insignificant when the dependent variable is the DGTW. 
There are several reasons that may explain this negative coefficient: (1) HHI itself is a measure 
of concentration, but not a perfect measure for competition; 2) My HHI measure is constructed at 
the country level. A country with a highly competitive mutual fund industry (low HHI) may also 
be a country with good information transparency. The adoption of IFRS in those countries will 
have less impact on the information environment. Thus the interaction term Post*HHI may 
capture a country fixed effect, instead of the effect of industry competition.  
To conclude, larger improvements in the stock-picking skills and return-generating ability in 
the foreign mutual funds were observed compared to the domestic ones after the IFRS adoption. 
However, the fact that the domestic funds perform worse after the adoption remains a puzzle that 
must be examined further. 
B. IFRS Adoption and Mutual Funds’ Asset Allocation Decisions 
I expect that better stock-picking skills should be accompanied by more investment. In this 
section, I consider how the adoption of IFRS in Europe changes the asset allocation decisions of 
EU and non-EU funds. 
Table 8 presents the univariate analysis of asset allocation decisions of EU and non-EU 
funds. During the three years before the IFRS adoption, non-EU funds invest 11.325% of their 
total assets under management (AUM) in Europe, compared to EU funds who invest 43.644% of 
their AUM in the domestic equity market. After the IFRS adoption, non-EU funds observe an 
increase of 0.589% of their AUM invested in Europe, while EU funds reduce their investment in 
the domestic market by 2.733%. 
The following multivariate analysis to examine the asset allocation decisions of global 
mutual funds was also performed: 
%AUMi,t = α + β1 NonEUi + β2 Postt + β3 NonEUi * Postt + ∑ βX Xi,t + ε (3) 
%AUM is the percentage of total assets under management invested in the European equity 
market for funds from non-EU countries (NonEU), and the percentage of total assets under 
management invested in the domestic equity market for EU funds (EU). All other variables are 
defined in the same way as in Model (1). 
Results from Model (3) are reported in Table 8. After controlling for fund characteristics, I 
observe that non-EU funds invest 1.5871% more of their AUM in Europe after the IFRS 
adoption. This increase is statistically significant (t-stat=5.321) and economically large. 
To conclude, my results suggest that the adoption of IFRS plays a role in leveling the playing 
field between non-EU (foreign) and EU (domestic) funds. After the adoption of IFRS in Europe, 
foreign funds invest a larger portion of their assets in the European equity market, which is 
consistent with their improved ability to generate abnormal returns (stock-picking skills and 
DGTW returns). 
 
C. Effects of IFRS adoption: A Cross-Sectional Analysis on Information Asymmetry 
In this segment, the second hypothesis is tested. If the differential impact of IFRS adoption 
on domestic and foreign funds is indeed attributed to the improved quality of financial 
disclosure, then a more significant difference between non-EU and EU funds should be observed 
when they invest in stocks with larger information asymmetry. I proxy for information 
asymmetry using 12-month stock return volatility and 5-year earnings volatility. 
The portfolio choices of EU and non-EU funds are examined first when they invest in stocks 
with different return volatilities over the past 12 months. Since holdings of a fund are not directly 
observable until the time it discloses the information, the actual time when the fund trades a 
specific stock could be in any month between two consecutive disclosures. In my sample, a 
significant part of the funds reports their holdings twice per year. To ensure that all return 
information is available when a fund trades a stock, the return volatility for stocks are calculated 
based on returns in months (t-17, t-6) before the time of holdings disclosure at time t.  
Table 10 presents a univariate analysis of the stock-picking skills of EU and non-EU funds 
when they invest in Europe. No significant difference is observed between the two groups of 
funds when they invest in stocks with low return volatility. When investing in high volatility 
stocks, non-EU funds earn an additional 3-day earnings announcement return of 0.361% after the 
IFRS adoption. As a comparison, domestic funds experience a loss of 0.098%. The difference 
between the two groups of funds is 0.459%. This difference is both statistically significant (t-
stat=4.88) and economically large. Table 11 presents a univariate analysis of the DGTW return. 
A larger improvement in the DGTW return is observed in foreign funds when they invest in 
stocks with high return volatilities. And no significant difference is observed between non-EU 
and EU funds in their relative performance before and after IFRS adoption when they invest in 
stocks with low return volatility. The DGTW results are consistent with the results of stock-
picking skills. 
Table 12 presents the asset allocation decisions of non-EU and EU funds. Both domestic and 
foreign mutual funds reduce their investment in stocks with low return volatility. This is 
reasonable because, with improved information transparency, some of the stocks with large 
information asymmetry before the IFRS adoption become good investment candidates afterward. 
I also observe that non-EU funds invest an additional 0.741% of their AUM in the high volatility 
stocks after IFRS adoption, compared to domestic funds who reduce their investment in the high 
volatility stocks by 1.674%. The net effect is that foreign funds shift their investment from low 
return volatility stocks to high return volatility stocks after the IFRS adoption. European funds, 
however, reduce their investment in their domestic equity markets. One possibility is that they 
shift more of their assets to European markets outside their countries. The asset allocation 
decision is consistent with my previous finding that domestic funds underperform in their 
domestic equity market after the adoption.  
This evidence suggests that the improvements in stock-picking skills for non-EU funds 
observed in Table 4 are mainly driven by their investments in stocks with high return volatilities. 
And the asset allocation decisions of domestic and foreign mutual funds are perfectly aligned 
with the change in their return-generating abilities. 
In the second set of tests, the information asymmetry is proxied using earnings volatility. 
Table 13 compares the stock-picking skills of non-EU and EU funds, and Table 14 compares 
their DGTW returns. I observe that both domestic and foreign funds improve their stock-picking 
skills when investing in stocks with higher earnings volatility. However, both funds earn lower 
DGTW returns in stocks with high earnings volatility after the IFRS adoption. This inconsistency 
could be due to different return-generating strategies captured by different measurements, or an 
unobserved time trend. When using their investment in stocks with low earnings volatility as a 
control for those unobserved factors, I reach a conclusion that is consistent with my previous 
finding: foreign funds show larger improvements in their performance when investing in stocks 
with higher earnings volatility. Also, consistent with the DGTW results, both foreign and 
domestic funds reduce their investment in the stocks with high earnings volatility, and the 
reduction of foreign funds is smaller than that of domestic funds.  
To conclude, controlling for the potential unobserved time trend, foreign funds earn larger 
abnormal returns from stocks with high earnings volatility after the IFRS adoption, and they are 
more willing to keep their assets in those stocks. 
D. Does the change in accounting standard comparability explains the IFRS effect? 
The adoption of IFRS reduce information cost through two potential channels: (1), IFRS 
adoption mandates the firm to disclose new information in their financial disclosures (I refer to it 
as the “information effect”); (2), IFRS is an accounting standard more comparable to the 
accounting standards in the investor’s home country. So the investors could better understand the 
financial reports and extract more accurate information (I refer to it as the “comparability 
effect”). The two channels are not mutually exclusive. In this section, I will first examine 
whether the improved comparability explains the superior performance of non-EU funds. 
The measure for comparability of accounting standards, namely accounting distance (AD), is 
adapted from Yu and Wahid (2014). In this measure, 21 accounting rules (Andersen et al., 2001) 
are examined between two accounting standards and the score is referred to as the accounting 
distance. A higher score implies a greater difference and less comparability between the two 
standards.  Change in AD (ΔAD) between investor and investee reflects the change in 
comparability. Positive ΔAD means the accounting standards are less comparable between 
investor and investee, and negative ΔAD means improved comparability. 
Since there is no variation in ΔAD for domestic funds (always zero) before and after the IFRS 
adoption, I will focus on the portfolio choices of foreign funds. I first calculate ΔAD for non-
European funds when they invest in European. For example, AD from US GAAP to IFRS, 
Germany and the United Kingdom are 4, 11, and 3 respectively. After the IFRS adoption, US 
mutual funds would experience a reduction in AD when investing in Germany (ΔADUS-Germany=4-
11=-7) and an increase in AD when investing in the UK (ΔADUS-UK=4-3=1). While AD from 
Japan to IFRS, Germany and the UK are 9, 8, and 10. So I have ΔADJapan-German=1 and ΔADJapan-
UK=-1. Following that, I form two portfolios for each non-EU funds based on the sign of ΔAD. 
For example, for a US mutual fund, all German stocks the fund holds will be assigned to the 
“decreased AD” portfolio, and all UK stocks the fund holds are assigned to the “increased AD” 
portfolio. While for Japanese mutual funds, all German stocks it holds are in the “increased AD” 
portfolio and all UK stocks in the “decreased AD” portfolio. All disclosure in my sample must 
contain both “increase” and “decrease” portfolios to ensure that my sample is balanced. In rare 
cases, the accounting distance remains unchanged after the adoption and these observations are 
also dropped from my sample. In an unreported robustness test, I show that it makes little 
difference between dropping those observations and including them in the “increase AD” or 
“decrease AD” portfolios. 
Table 16 presents the result. I find that the improvements in stock-picking skills of non-EU 
are predominantly driven by their investment in countries where the accounting distance 
increased after IFRS adoption (A 3-day market-adjusted return of 0.438%, with t-stat=3.74). 
While the increase of the skills is marginally insignificant in countries where the accounting 
distance decreases (a 3-day return of 0.108% with t-stat=1.31). My results here suggest that the 
observed improvements in foreign mutual funds are not explained by the more familiarity of 
investors with the new accounting standards in IFRS. 
E. Does the increased information content explain the IFRS effect? 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no standard way to compare the information content of 
the financial reports across different countries.  To address this challenge, I compare the 
performance of the same fund when investing in stocks in the same country with different 
information asymmetry. Stocks in the same country follow the same accounting standards before 
and after the adoption of IFRS. When the same fund invests in the low and high information 
asymmetry stocks in the same country, the change in accounting distance is identical for the two 
sub-portfolios.  Any differences observed in the stock-picking skills in the two groups of stocks 
will most likely be explained by the change in the information content of the two groups of 
stocks. 
To conduct the test, stocks in each European country are first assigned to high and low 
information asymmetry groups based on their return volatility/earnings volatility. Then I 
compare the stock-picking skills of non-EU funds when they invest in the two groups of stocks.  
Table 17 presents the stock-picking skills of foreign funds when investing in stocks with 
different return volatilities. I observe a significant improvement in stock-picking skills when 
foreign funds invest in stocks with high return volatilities. A foreign fund could earn an 
additional 3-day return of 0.499% when investing in stocks with high return volatilities after the 
IFRS adoption.  Table 18 presents the stock-picking skills of foreign funds when investing in 
stocks with different earnings volatilities. Similarly, foreign funds earn an additional 3-day return 
of 0.576% after the IFRS adoption when they invest in stocks with high earnings volatility. My 
results here show that foreign funds show larger improvements in stocks that are more affected 
by the adoption of IFRS.  
To summarize, the more significant improvements in the stock-picking skills of non-EU 
funds after the IFRS adoption are explained by the new information mandatorily disclosed by the 
firms, but not the increased familiarity with the new accounting standard IFRS. 
  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Information acquisition is an important determinant in a fund’s profitability. Literature has 
shown that shocks that change firms’ information environment could alter the competitive 
advantages of funds from big and small families. In this paper, I show that a shock to the quality 
of financial disclosures affects the competitive advantages of domestic and foreign investors. I 
further segregate the impact of the IFRS adoption into the comparability effect and the 
information effect and provide evidence to support the information effect.  
My findings extend the research on IFRS by showing that the adoption of IFRS does provide 
information that could affect the portfolio choices of foreign investors. I also contribute to the 
positive accounting theory by showing that financial disclosures do provide information that is 
useful for investors. Although investors rely on information to make decisions, to mandate more 
information disclosure might not make all investors better off. Instead, the information disclosure 
plays a regulatory role to level the playing ground between different groups of investors. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics.  This table presents summary statistics of the funds from non-
European countries (Non-EU) that did adopt IFRS in 2005 in Panel A and that for the funds from 
European Union countries (EU) that adopted IFRS in 2005. Fund Number is the number of 
unique funds in each country. Fund_Size is the average size of funds in each country. AUM% is 
the average percentage of assets invested in securities of the investee firms that adopt IFRS in 
2005. 
 
 
Panel A. Funds from Non-EU Countries (non-
adopting)      
         
Country 
  2004   2008 
  
Fund 
Number 
Fund Size 
(Million $) 
AUM%    
Fund 
Number 
Fund Size 
(Million 
$) 
AUM%  
Argentina  6 15.25 16.2%  8 3.94 31.9% 
Canada  345 346.45 15.6%  393 356.4 16.1% 
Chile  6 3.57 13.7%  5 1.21 7.6% 
Czech Republic  5 38.2 34.2%  5 86.05 40.0% 
Estonia  3 90.03 20.9%  3 123.26 40.3% 
Hungary  1 6.59 9.1%  1 25.98 28.6% 
Iceland  1 9.06 15.5%  1 75.63 26.9% 
India  4 60 2.6%  1 37.35 0.0% 
Japan  38 69.16 40.7%  46 250.36 40.3% 
Malaysia  20 24.21 1.4%  22 10.71 4.1% 
Malta  1 757.08 28.7%  1 555.83 14.7% 
Mexico  1 28.92 0.9%  3 23.43 3.3% 
United States   2537 1224.69 12.6%   2712 1032.79 13.6% 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
    
Panel B. Funds from EU Countries (adopting) 
    
         
Country 
  2004   2008 
  
Fund 
Number 
Fund Size 
(Million $) 
AUM%    
Fund 
Number 
Fund Size 
(Million 
$) 
AUM%  
Austria  90 68.28 52.5%  96 81.33 53.3% 
Belgium  124 155.69 73.4%  126 137.79 65.2% 
Denmark  101 137.86 61.3%  108 160.21 61.4% 
Finland  51 89.58 84.0%  57 74.26 79.1% 
France  236 263.27 81.8%  257 240.6 79.8% 
Germany  384 288.95 71.6%  399 255.45 70.5% 
Greece  12 93.67 90.2%  13 62.17 93.1% 
Ireland  53 478.1 55.1%  56 313.93 58.5% 
Italy  133 218.84 65.3%  130 105.8 65.6% 
Luxembourg  100 118.48 55.7%  101 97.83 54.8% 
Netherlands  78 704.14 55.8%  78 494.34 56.0% 
Norway  95 139.44 77.8%  94 159.59 73.7% 
Poland  7 200.1 97.9%  6 268.59 90.1% 
Portugal  43 44.51 80.4%  44 31.41 79.0% 
Spain  1406 14.92 82.5%  1484 8.94 84.1% 
Sweden 
 
188 415.48 72.1% 
 
180 237.23 69.6% 
Switzerland 
 
269 199.6 60.7% 
 
289 262.54 56.7% 
United Kingdom   889 638.72 68.6%   920 678.83 65.6% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Attrition table. This table presents the percentage of unique funds kept in the sample in 
the process of sample selection. # of Funds presents the total number of funds. I kept active 
mutual funds (Active Mutual Funds) with identifiable country and investment styles (With 
Identifiable Country and Investment Style). Funds with the following investment styles are kept 
in the sample: aggressive growth, core growth, core value, deep value, GARP, growth, income 
value, international, momentum, specialty, yield, mixed style, and sector-specific (Style of 
Interest). To get a balanced sample, I also require the funds to invest in the adopting countries 
within 3 years before and after the year 2005 (Funds Invest in Adpt Area Before and After 2005).  
 
 
 Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
# of Funds 29557 28851 30484 32706 33861 33674 
Active Mutual Funds 93% 92% 92% 91% 91% 90% 
With Identifiable Country 
and Investment Style 
32% 34% 34% 34% 35% 36% 
Style of Interest 25% 27% 27% 27% 27% 28% 
Funds Invest in Adpt Area 
Before and After 2005 
21% 23% 23% 21% 21% 21% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Indexes used for calculating market-adjusted returns. This table presents the local 
indices I use to calculate market-adjusted returns. 
 
 
Country Name Index 
 
Non-Adopting Countries 
Argentina Buenos Aires S.E. General Index 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index (formerly TSE 300) 
Chile HSBC Securities - Chile 
Czech Republic Prague Stock Exchange PX 50 Index 
Estonia Tallinn Stock Exchange Index 
Hungary Budapest Stock Exchange Index 
India Bombay S.E. National Index 
Japan Nikkei 225 Index 
Malaysia Kuala Lumpur S.E. Composite Index 
Mexico Mexican S.E. IPC Index 
United States S&P 500 Composite Index 
  
Adopting Countries in Europe 
Austria Vienna S.E. Index (WBI) 
Belgium Belgian General Return Index 
Denmark Copenhagen S.E. All-Share Index 
Finland Helsinki S.E. General Index (HEX) 
France SBF 250 Index 
Germany DAX Composite Index (DAX 300) 
Greece Athens S.E. General Index 
Ireland Irish S.E. General Index 
Italy BCI All Share Index (COMIT) 
Luxembourg Luxembourg S.E. Index 
Netherlands CBS All Share Index 
Norway Oslo S.E. General Index 
Poland Warsaw W.I.G Index 
Portugal Banco Totta & Acores Index 
Spain Madrid S.E. General Index 
Sweden Affarsvarlden General Index 
Switzerland SBC 100 
United Kingdom FT-SE All-Share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Stock-picking skills of global mutual funds before and after IFRS adoption. This 
table presents the stock-picking skills of global funds before and after the 2005 IFRS adoption. 
Following Baker et al., (2010), stock-picking skills are measured as the 3-day earnings 
announcement return of the stocks that a mutual fund trades (First Buy – Last Sell). Pre-adopting 
period (Pre) is the three years before IFRS adoption in Europe (2003-2005). Post period (Post) is 
the three years after adoption (2007-2009). Panel A compares the stock-picking skills of mutual 
funds from non-European Union countries (“NonEU”) and funds from European Union countries 
(“EU”) when they invest in EU countries. In this panel, non-EU funds are foreign funds and EU 
funds are domestic funds. Panel B compares the stock-picking skills of Non-EU and EU funds 
when they invest in the equity market outside Europe (Australia, Philippines, and South Africa 
excluded). In this panel, non-EU funds are domestic funds and EU funds are foreign funds. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Stock picking skills of global mutual funds when investing in the European 
countries. 
Fund  
First Buy - Last Sell   # Obs 
Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU (Foreign) 
-0.042 0.291*** 0.333*** 
 
7644 7958 
(-0.83) (5.91) (4.17) 
   
EU (Domestic) 
0.024 -0.082** -0.106** 
 
20831 16798 
(0.77) (-2.42) (-2.36) 
   
NonEU - EU 
-0.065 0.373*** 0.438*** 
   
(-1.32) (4.84) (5.23)       
       
       
Panel B. Stock picking skills of global mutual funds when investing in the non-
European countries. 
Fund  
First Buy - Last Sell   # Obs 
Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU (Domestic) 
0.015 0.255*** 0.241*** 
 
28672 29098 
(0.52) (9.18) (6.25) 
   
EU (Foreign) 
-0.072* 0.063 0.135** 
 
16092 13917 
(-1.92) (1.57) (2.30) 
   
NonEU - EU 
0.086** 0.192*** 0.106 
   
(2.29) (3.24) (1.56)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Stock-picking skills of global mutual funds: Multivariate analysis. This table 
presents the coefficients and t-stats from a difference-in-differences regression that compares the 
stock-picking skills of EU and Non-EU funds during the year between 2003 and 2009. The 
dependent variable is the stock-picking skills of mutual funds (First Buy – Last Sell). Non-EU is 
an indicator variable that equals 0 if a fund is domiciled in Europe and 1 otherwise. Post is an 
indicator variable that equals 0 during the 3 years before IFRS adoption (2003-2005), equals 1 
during the 3 years after IFRS adoption (2007-2009). Year 2004 – Year 2009 are indicator 
variables for respective years. PortSize is calculated as log (1+ total assets invested in European 
equity market) for non-European funds, and log (1 + total assets invested in domestic equity 
market) for European funds. FundSize is calculated as log(1 + total assets under management). 
EU Experience is calculated as log(1 + months since the first time when a fund invested in EU). 
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  First Buy - Last Sell 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
    NonEU 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 
(0.24) (1.45) (1.28) (1.20) 
NonEU * Post 0.30*** 
   
 
(4.42) 
   Post -0.10*** 
   
 
(-2.63) 
   NonEU * 2003 
 
-0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40*** 
  
(-3.52) (-3.55) (-4.21) 
NonEU * 2004 
 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
  
(-0.53) (-0.56) (-1.16) 
NonEU * 2005 
 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
  
(-0.68) (-0.68) (-1.60) 
NonEU * 2007 
 
0.46*** 0.46*** 0.46* 
  
(3.98) (2.80) (1.95) 
NonEU * 2008 
 
0.28** 0.28** 0.28** 
  
(2.46) (2.16) (2.43) 
NonEU * 2009 
 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
  
(-1.23) (-1.27) (-1.30) 
Year 2004 
 
-0.14** -0.14*** -0.14** 
  
(-2.47) (-3.32) (-2.62) 
Year 2005 
 
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
  
(-4.32) (-5.61) (-5.54) 
Year 2007 
 
-0.24*** -0.24*** -0.24** 
  
(-4.18) (-3.26) (-2.20) 
Year 2008 
 
-0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17* 
  
(-2.85) (-2.91) (-1.76) 
Year 2009 
 
-0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20** 
  
(-3.51) (-4.38) (-2.47) 
Port Size -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.27) 
Fund Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
EU Experience -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(-0.87) (-0.04) (-0.04) (-0.03) 
Constant 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
(1.20) (1.57) (1.61) (1.63) 
     Observations 89,937 89,937 89,937 89,937 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cluster by - - Fund Country 
t-statistics in 
parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. DGTW returns of global mutual funds before and after IFRS adoption. This table 
presents the DGTW returns of global funds before and after the 2005 IFRS adoption. Following 
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), portfolio performance is measured using DGTW 
return, calculated as the value-weighted benchmark-adjusted returns of all stocks in the portfolio. 
Pre-adopting period (Pre) is the three years before the IFRS adoption in Europe (2003-2005). 
Post period (Post) is the three years after the IFRS adoption (2007-2009). In Panel A, DGTW 
return is calculated using the stock returns in the future 6 months, adjusted by the benchmarks of 
the 125 passive portfolios based on market cap and book-to-market in the previous year, and 
momentum in the previous 6 months. In Panel B, DGTW return is calculated using the stock 
returns in the future 12 months, adjusted by the benchmarks of the 125 passive portfolios based 
on market cap and book-to-market in the previous year, and momentum in the previous 12 
months. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. 6-month DGTW Return 
        
    Stock-Picking Skills   # Obs 
    Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU(Foreign)  
-0.780** 0.792** 1.572*** 
 
11977 13679 
 
(-1.99) (2.16) (3.36) 
   
EU (Domestic)  
-0.022 -0.582** -0.560 
 
28499 25651 
 
(-0.09) (-2.18) (-1.40) 
   
NonEU - EU  
-0.758*** 1.374** 2.133*** 
   
  (-4.50) (2.32) (3.28)       
        
        
Panel B.12-month DGTW Return 
        
    Stock-Picking Skills   # Obs 
    Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU(Domestic)  
-1.215** 2.111*** 3.326*** 
 
11977 13679 
 
(-2.08) (3.87) (5.02) 
   
EU (Foreign)  
-0.741* -1.259*** -0.518 
 
28499 25651 
 
(-1.96) (-3.16) (-0.85) 
   
NonEU - EU  
-0.475** 3.370*** 3.844*** 
   
  (-2.18) (3.87) (3.97)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Mutual fund performance and industry concentration/competition. This table 
reports the impact of mutual fund industry concentration on the differential effect of IFRS 
adoption on domestic and foreign mutual funds. Following Feldman et al, 2018, mutual fund 
industry concentration in each country is proxied by Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
calculated using the market share of all active-managed mutual funds in the country. The effects 
of the IFRS adoption on mutual funds are measured as the stock-picking skills (Column 1 and 2) 
or DGTW returns (Column 3 and 4). NonEU, Post, PortSize, FundSize, and EU Experience are 
defined in the same way as in table 5. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
  Stock-Picking Skills DGTW 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
NonEU 0.01 0.01 0.62 0.67 
 
(0.24) (0.20) (1.12) (1.17) 
Post -0.10*** -0.03 0.85** 0.61 
 
(-2.63) (-0.56) (2.25) (1.31) 
HHI 
 
0.20 
 
0.33 
  
(0.39) 
 
(0.07) 
NonEU * Post 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.22 0.48 
 
(4.42) (2.71) (0.32) (0.66) 
NonEU * HHI 
 
-0.77 
 
0.54 
  
(-0.97) 
 
(0.08) 
Post * HHI 
 
-2.40** 
 
8.44 
  
(-2.55) 
 
(0.87) 
NonEU * Post * HHI 
 
4.03*** 
 
-9.82 
  
(3.15) 
 
(-0.81) 
Port Size -0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.10 
 
(-0.31) (-0.33) (0.62) (0.65) 
Fund Size 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 
 
(0.13) (0.49) (-0.36) (-0.52) 
EU Experience -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.10 
 
(-0.87) (-0.99) (0.52) (0.60) 
Constant 0.15 0.06 -2.12* -1.81 
 
(1.20) (0.49) (-1.73) (-1.42) 
     Observations 89,937 89,937 135,536 135,536 
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
t-statistics in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
Table 8.  Asset allocation of global mutual funds before and after IFRS adoption. This table 
presents the asset allocation of global funds before and after the 2005 IFRS adoption. Pre-
adopting period (Pre) is the three years before the IFRS adoption in Europe (2003-2005). Post 
period (Post) is the three years after the IFRS adoption (2007-2009). Panel A presents the 
percentage of total assets (%AUM) invested in EU equity market for mutual funds from non-EU 
countries (“Non-EU”) and %AUM invested in the domestic equity market for EU funds (“EU”). 
In this panel, non-EU funds are foreign funds and EU funds are domestic funds. Panel B 
compares the %AUM invested in non-EU equity market (Australia, Philippine, and South Africa 
excluded) for EU and Non-EU funds. In this panel, non-EU funds are domestic funds and EU 
funds are foreign funds. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Asset allocation of global mutual funds when investing in the European area. 
 Funds 
%AUM invested in EU   # Obs 
Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU (Foreign) 
11.325*** 11.914*** 0.589*** 
 
27679 28312 
(70.48) (74.98) (3.77) 
   
EU (Domestic) 
43.644*** 40.922*** -2.722*** 
 
29927 27336 
(282.41) (253.07) (-9.90) 
   
NonEU - EU 
-32.319*** -29.008*** 3.311*** 
   
(-146.54) (-127.91) (10.41)       
       
Panel B. Asset allocation of global mutual funds when investing in the non-European 
area. 
Funds  
%AUM invested in Non-EU area   # Obs 
Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
NonEU(Domestic) 
82.989*** 81.939*** -1.050*** 
 
29881 30135 
(570.45) (565.62) (-5.79) 
   
EU (Foreign) 
29.520*** 30.573*** 1.052*** 
 
22368 19910 
(175.56) (171.54) (3.75) 
   
NonEU - EU 
53.468*** 51.366*** -2.102*** 
   
(231.38) (212.55) (-6.58)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Asset allocation of global mutual funds: Multivariate analysis. This table presents 
the asset allocation of global funds before and after the IFRS adoption. The dependent variable is 
the percentage of total assets (%AUM) invested in the EU equity market for mutual funds from 
non-EU countries (“NonEU”) and the percentage of total assets invested in the domestic equity 
market for EU funds (“EU”). NonEU is an indicator variable that equals 0 if a fund is domiciled 
in Europe and 1 otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals 0 during the 3 years before 
the IFRS adoption (2003-2005), and equals 1 during the 3 years after the IFRS adoption (2007-
2009). PortSize is calculated as log (1+ total assets invested in European equity market) for non-
European funds, and log (1 + total assets invested in domestic equity market) for European 
funds. FundSize is calculated as log(1 + total assets under management). EU Experience is 
calculated as log(1 + months since the first time when a fund invested in EU). t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
  %AUM invested in EU 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
NonEU -32.3186*** -31.1044*** -16.9613*** -16.6435*** 
 
(-144.956) (-141.743) (-67.326) (-66.195) 
Post -2.7221*** -2.2847*** -2.3732*** -5.0472*** 
 
(-12.170) (-10.410) (-11.296) (-21.722) 
NonEU * Post 3.3110*** 2.1139*** 1.4861*** 1.5871*** 
 
(10.413) (6.765) (4.968) (5.321) 
PortSize 
 
1.7083*** 4.1222*** 4.0835*** 
  
(67.501) (121.538) (120.659) 
FundSize
  
-4.9282*** -5.1497*** 
   
(-101.689) (-105.039) 
EU Experience 
   
4.2980*** 
    
(26.576) 
Constant 43.6438*** 15.6453*** 59.1381*** 45.8908*** 
 
(282.400) (35.420) (98.331) (58.856) 
     Observations 113,254 113,168 113,168 113,168 
R-squared 0.249 0.278 0.338 0.342 
t-statistics in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Stock return volatility and stock-picking skills. This table compares the stock-
picking skills of EU and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in stocks with different return 
volatilities in Europe. Return volatility is measured as the volatility of the monthly return of a 
stock in the 12 months (-17, -6) before holdings disclosure. A stock is assigned to the low (high) 
volatility group if its return volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 70%) of all the stocks in 
the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Ret Vol   Pre Post 
Post - 
Pre 
  Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) -0.050 -0.036 0.014   5209 4701 
 
(-0.79) (-0.53) (0.15) 
   
EU(Domestic) 0.029 0.139** 0.109 
 
6393 6519 
 
(0.51) (2.43) (1.36) 
   
NonEU - EU -0.080 -0.175* -0.095 
   
 
(-1.16) (-1.68) (-0.77) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) -0.037 0.325*** 0.361*** 
 
6406 6891 
 
(-0.63) (5.84) (3.96) 
   
EU(Domestic) 0.006 -0.092** -0.098** 
 
19695 15814 
 
(0.17) (-2.51) (-2.02) 
   
NonEU - EU -0.042 0.417*** 0.459*** 
   
 
(-0.75) (4.82) (4.88) 
   
        
Hi-Lo    
0.554*** 
   
      (3.571)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Stock return volatility and DGTW returns. This table compares the performance of 
EU and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in stocks with different return volatilities in 
Europe. Fund performance is measured as the benchmark-adjusted return, following Daniel et al. 
(1997). Return volatility is measured as the volatility of the monthly return of a stock in the 12 
months (-17, -6) before holdings disclosure. A stock is assigned to the low (high) volatility group 
if its return volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 70%) of all the stocks in the same 
country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Ret Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) 2.364*** 2.440*** 0.075   8772 7306 
 
(6.11) (5.76) (0.13) 
   
EU(Domestic) -0.554** 0.596** 1.150*** 
 
25171 14720 
 
(-2.43) (2.00) (3.00) 
   
NonEU – EU 2.918*** 1.844*** -1.075 
   
 
(8.30) (3.12) (-1.57) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) -2.522*** -0.746*** 1.776*** 
 
9534 6457 
 
(-14.91) (-3.63) (7.92) 
   
EU(Domestic) -0.333** -0.300* 0.033 
 
12942 9002 
 
(-2.30) (-1.73) (0.13) 
   
NonEU - EU -2.188*** -0.445* 1.743*** 
   
 
(-9.98) (-1.78) (4.99) 
   
        
Hi-Lo 
   
2.818*** 
   
        (5.54)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Stock return volatility and asset allocation of global funds. This table compares the 
asset allocation decisions of EU and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in stocks with 
different return volatilities in Europe. Asset allocation is measured as the percentage of AUM 
invested in the European market (for non-EU funds) and in the domestic market (for EU funds). 
Return volatility is measured as the volatility of the monthly return of a stock in the 12 months (-
17, -6) before holdings disclosure. A stock is assigned to the low (high) volatility group if its 
return volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 70%) of all the stocks in the same country. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Ret Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) 4.810*** 4.658*** -0.152**   27679 28312 
 
(64.69) (63.36) (-2.03) 
   
EU(Domestic) 8.642*** 7.594*** -1.048*** 
 
29927 27336 
 
(120.85) (101.49) (-8.40) 
   
NonEU - EU -3.832*** -2.936*** 0.897*** 
   
 
(-34.53) (-31.22) (6.09) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) 6.515*** 7.256*** 0.741*** 
 
27679 28312 
 
(48.43) (54.55) (7.79) 
   
EU(Domestic) 35.002*** 33.328*** -1.674*** 
 
29927 27336 
 
(270.53) (246.19) (-6.80) 
   
NonEU - EU -28.486*** -26.072*** 2.414*** 
   
 
(-155.70) (-137.02) (9.07) 
   
        
Hi-Lo    
1.518*** 
   
      (4.991)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Earnings volatility and stock-picking skills. This table compares the stock-picking 
skills of EU and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in stocks with different earnings 
volatilities in Europe. Earnings volatility is measured as the standard error of Earnings before 
Interest & Taxes between the year t-5 and t-1, deflated by the mean. A stock is assigned to the 
low (high) volatility group if its earnings volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 30%) of 
all the stocks in the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
EBIT Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) 0.143* -0.088 -0.231*   2726 3136 
 
(1.70) (-1.12) (-1.74) 
   
EU(Domestic) 0.028 0.170*** 0.142** 
 
11474 7825 
 
(0.68) (3.42) (2.19) 
   
NonEU - EU 0.115 -0.258** -0.373*** 
   
 
-1.23 (-2.26) (-2.83) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) 0.041 0.909*** 0.868*** 
 
4420 3395 
 
(0.53) (10.18) (6.05) 
   
EU(Domestic) -0.015 0.126** 0.141* 
 
12008 7429 
 
(-0.31) (2.09) (1.75) 
   
NonEU - EU 0.056 0.783*** 0.728*** 
   
 
(0.73) (5.37) (5.14) 
   
        
Hi-Lo    
1.100*** 
   
      (5.62)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Earnings volatility and DGTW returns. This table compares the performance of EU 
and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in stocks with different earnings volatilities in 
Europe. Fund performance is measured as the benchmark-adjusted return, following Daniel et al. 
(1997). Earnings volatility is measured as the standard error of Earnings before Interest & Taxes 
between the year t-5 and t-1, deflated by the mean. A stock is assigned to the low (high) 
volatility group if its earnings volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 30%) of all the stocks 
in the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
EBIT Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) -0.023 0.806 0.829   6670 7559 
 
(-0.02) (0.56) (0.23) 
   
EU(Domestic) 0.785 3.220*** 2.435*** 
 
21347 17723 
 
(1.12) (3.29) (2.68) 
   
NonEU - EU -0.808** -2.415 -1.606 
   
 
(-2.06) (-0.64) (-0.71) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) 1.144** -2.243*** -3.387*** 
 
9076 9133 
 
(2.44) (-3.96) (-7.66) 
   
EU(Domestic) 0.527* -4.475*** -5.002*** 
 
25395 16181 
 
(1.88) (-10.52) (-5.86) 
   
NonEU - EU 0.617** 2.232** 1.615* 
   
 
(2.44) (2.41) (1.81) 
   
        
Hi-Lo    
3.221** 
   
      (2.22)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15. Earnings volatility and asset allocation of global mutual funds. This table 
compares the asset allocation decisions of EU and non-EU mutual funds when they invest in 
stocks with different earnings volatilities in Europe. Asset allocation is measured as the 
percentage of AUM invested in Europe (for non-EU funds) and percentage of AUM invested in 
the domestic market (for EU funds). Earnings volatility is measured as the standard error of 
Earnings before Interest & Taxes between the year t-5 and t-1, deflated by the mean. A stock is 
assigned to the low (high) volatility group if its earnings volatility is ranked in the lower 30% 
(higher 30%) of all the stocks in the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
EBIT Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low 
NonEU(Foreign) 1.393*** 1.148*** -0.245***   20587 22483 
 
(27.32) (23.54) (-10.19) 
   
EU(Domestic) 8.135*** 7.494*** -0.641*** 
 
27826 23679 
 
(185.47) (157.61) (-7.46) 
   
NonEU - EU -6.742*** -6.345*** 0.397*** 
   
 
(-115.79) (-93.82) (4.14) 
   
        
High 
NonEU(Foreign) 3.359*** 2.742*** -0.617*** 
 
20587 22483 
 
(66.32) (56.57) (-13.93) 
   
EU(Domestic) 10.959*** 5.181*** -5.777*** 
 
27826 23679 
 
(251.53) (109.70) (-74.81) 
   
NonEU - EU -7.599*** -2.439*** 5.160*** 
   
 
(-108.82) (-44.16) (54.26) 
   
        
Hi-Lo    
4.763*** 
   
      (35.30)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Accounting standards comparability and stock-picking skills of foreign mutual 
funds. This table presents the stock-picking skills of non-EU funds when they invest in EU 
countries with increased and decreased accounting distances. The measure of accounting 
distance follows Yu and Wahid (2014). t-statistics are reported in parenthesis except for the 
interaction term, which presents the Chi-square test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. First Buy – Last Sell (Raw) 
Acct Dist   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Dec  
-0.092 0.075 0.167* 
 
6003 6268 
 
(-1.35) (1.14) (1.93) 
   
Inc  
0.027 0.478*** 0.451*** 
 
5001 5051 
 
(0.36) (6.45) (3.95) 
   
Inc - Dec  
0.118 0.402*** 0.284** 
   
  (1.52) (3.34) (4.02)       
        
Panel B. First Buy – Last Sell (Market Adjusted) 
Acct Dist   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Dec  
-0.080 0.029 0.108 
 
6003 6268 
 
(-1.18) (0.44) (1.31) 
   
Inc  
0.011 0.449*** 0.438*** 
 
5001 5051 
 
(0.15) (6.10) (3.74) 
   
Inc - Dec  
0.090 0.420*** 0.330** 
   
  (1.13) (3.53) (5.49)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Stock return volatility and stock-picking skills of foreign funds.  This panel 
compares the stock-picking skills of non-EU funds when they invest in stocks with different 
return volatilities in Europe. Return volatility is measured as the volatility of the monthly return 
of a stock in the 12 months (-17, -6) before holdings disclosure. A stock is assigned to the low 
(high) volatility group if its return volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 70%) of all the 
stocks in the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Raw Return 
Ret Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low  
0.012 0.083 0.071 
 
5209 3109 
 
(0.17) (0.89) (0.58) 
   
High  
-0.033 0.635*** 0.668*** 
 
6256 4613 
 
(-0.49) (8.25) (5.76) 
   
Hi-Lo  
-0.045 0.552*** 0.597*** 
   
  (-0.62) (3.61) (14.62)       
        
Panel B. Mkt Ajd Return 
Ret Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low  
-0.050 0.031 0.082 
 
5209 3109 
 
(-0.70) (0.34) (0.66) 
   
High  
-0.010 0.571*** 0.580*** 
 
6256 4613 
 
(-0.15) (7.49) (5.13) 
   
Hi-Lo  
0.041 0.539*** 0.499*** 
   
  (0.56) (3.58) (10.44)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Earnings volatility and stock-picking skills of foreign funds. This panel compares 
the stock-picking skills of non-EU funds when they invest in stocks with different earnings 
volatilities in Europe. Earnings volatility is measured as the standard error of Earnings before 
Interest & Taxes between year t-5 and t-1, deflated by the mean. A stock is assigned to the low 
(high) volatility group if its earnings volatility is ranked in the lower 30% (higher 30%) of all the 
stocks in the same country. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Raw Return 
Earnings Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low  
0.068** -0.086** -0.154*** 
 
21635 12724 
 
(2.07) (-1.99) (-2.71) 
   
High  
0.110*** 0.674*** 0.565*** 
 
29115 11928 
 
(3.84) (15.11) (8.03) 
   
Hi-Lo  
0.041 0.760*** 0.719*** 
   
  (1.22) (9.06) (89.55)       
        
Panel B. Mkt Adj Return 
Earnings Vol   Pre Post Post - Pre   Pre Post 
Low  
0.079** -0.011 -0.090 
 
21635 12724 
 
(2.37) (-0.25) (-1.56) 
   
High  
0.039 0.526*** 0.486*** 
 
29115 11928 
 
(1.38) (11.75) (6.91) 
   
Hi-Lo  
-0.039 0.536*** 0.576*** 
   
  (-1.14) (6.39) (57.11)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Measurement of stock-picking skills. This diagram explains the measurement of 
stock-picking skills of a mutual fund. Assuming that a fund f schedules two consecutive holdings 
disclosure in April and July. In July’s disclosure, stock s appears in fund f’s portfolio for the first 
time in the past three years (at least). The quarter from April to July will be the time when the 
fund f “first-buys” stock s. Meanwhile, stock s schedules two consecutive quarterly earnings 
announcements in May and August. As shown in the figure, the closest earnings announcement 
following fund f’s “first-buy” of stock s will be the one in August. The 3-day return centers 
around stock s’ earnings announcement in August will reflect the fund f’s picking skill in stock s.  
Similarly, if stock s appears in the portfolio of fund f in April but not afterward for at least three 
years, then fund f “last-sells” stock s in the quarter from April to July. Then the stock-picking 
skill of fund f in the quarter from April to July is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the 
3-day returns of all “first-buy” stocks minus the equal-weighted average of the 3-day returns of 
all “last-sell” stocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Time trend of stock-picking skills. This figure presents the stock-picking skills of 
global mutual funds when investing in European stocks. Stock-picking skill is measured as the 
earnings announcement return of the stocks that the funds trade. 2006 is the first year when 
European firms adopt IFRS. “NonEU” presents the stock-picking skills of mutual funds from 
non-European countries, excluding Australia, Philippine and South Africa. “EU(Dom)” presents 
the stock-picking skills of mutual funds from European countries when investing in domestic 
stocks. 
 
 
 
